Moral Realism

Mackie's argument from ontological queerness is:

1. If moral realism is true, then moral judgements are made true by the existence of objectively existing and necessarily motivating entities.

2. Objectively existing and necessarily motivating entities are metaphysically queer.

3. We have no reason to believe in the existence of metaphysically queer entities (application of Ockham's razor).

Therefore: 4. Moral realism is false.

The idea in (2) that such an entity is metaphysically queer is currently unjustified – it is a subjective statement. This may change if more is

Secondly, even if it were true, the premise in (3) is not true for various reasons; even if no scientific proof of a God may exist, there may be other kinds of valid proof such as personal choice, personal observational belief (which cannot be replicated because it may also be considered subjective). other subjective arguments which one may consider personally convincing.

Finally, the premise in (4) that we have no reason to believe (it), and therefore it is false, is a logical fallacy; our assumption or possible lack of evidence is not proof against a possible objective reality.

In further discussions it appears I may have misunderstood the argument in the first place, so this document is a 'fixme'.