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--- thirteen_principles_of_hermeneutics [2025/04/18 17:32] – appledog
+++ thirteen_principles_of_hermeneutics [2025/04/18 17:35] (current) – appledog
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 * from https://images.shulcloud.com/1520/uploads/ThirteenPrinciplesofRabbiYishmael.pdf
-== Article
+== Thirteen Principles of Rabbi Yishmael & Their Explanations
-=== Thirteen Principles of Rabbi Yishmael & Their Explanations
 Sifra B’raita d’Rabbi Yishmael
@@ Line 22: / Line 21: @@
 * 13) shnei kethuvim hamakchishim zeh eth zeh ad sheyavo hakathuv hashlishi veyachriya beneihem (two verses that contradict each other until a third verse comes and resolves the contradiction).
-=== Siddur Lev Shalem – Principles of Interpreting Torah – from Sifra 1
+== Siddur Lev Shalem – Principles of Interpreting Torah – from Sifra 1
 Rabbi Ishmael taught that the Torah is expounded by these thirteen rules of textual
 interpretation:
-* A restriction applicable in general circumstances certainly applies to a more limited
+* A restriction applicable in general circumstances certainly applies to a more limited circumstance.
-circumstance.
 * A general rule may be inferred from a similar phrase in two different texts.
 * A general rule may be derived from a single text or from two related texts.
-* A rule stated in general terms, but followed by one or two particular examples, is limited
+* A rule stated in general terms, but followed by one or two particular examples, is limited to those particular circumstances.
-to those particular circumstances.
+* When a particular circumstance is stated and is then followed by a general rule, the law is expanded to include all that is similar to the particular circumstance.
-* When a particular circumstance is stated and is then followed by a general rule, the law
+* When a general rule is stated, followed by a specific application, and then the general rule is restated, the law must be interpreted in terms of the specific limitation.
-is expanded to include all that is similar to the particular circumstance.
+* If the specification is needed to clarify an ambiguity in the general rule, then the specification teaches something about the general rule.
-* When a general rule is stated, followed by a specific application, and then the general
+* But when a subject naturally included in a general rule is treated separately, it is meant to limit the rule.
-rule is restated, the law must be interpreted in terms of the specific limitation.
+* When the text states a general rule and specifies a penalty and then follows it with a particular instance covered by the general rule but does not state a punishment for it, it is meant to ordain a lesser penalty for the latter circumstance.
-* If the specification is needed to clarify an ambiguity in the general rule, then the
+* However, when a penalty is specified for a violation of the general rule and then is followed by a dissimilar circumstance, either a lesser or greater penalty may be intended.
-specification teaches something about the general rule.
+* A circumstance logically falling within a general rule but treated separately in the Torah remains outside the rule, unless the text specifically states that it is part of the general rule.
-* But when a subject naturally included in a general rule is treated separately, it is meant
-to limit the rule.
-* When the text states a general rule and specifies a penalty and then follows it with a
-particular instance covered by the general rule but does not state a punishment for it, it
-is meant to ordain a lesser penalty for the latter circumstance.
-* However, when a penalty is specified for a violation of the general rule and then is
-followed by a dissimilar circumstance, either a lesser or greater penalty may be
-intended.
-* A circumstance logically falling within a general rule but treated separately in the Torah
-remains outside the rule, unless the text specifically states that it is part of the general
-rule.
 * An obscure text may be clarified by its context or by subsequent usage.
 * Finally, contradictions between two texts may be reconciled by means of a third text.
-First Principle – Siddur Lev Shalem
+=== First Principle – Siddur Lev Shalem
-A restriction applicable in general circumstances certainly applies to a more limited
+A restriction applicable in general circumstances certainly applies to a more limited circumstance.
-circumstance.
 First Principle – Kal Vachomer – Sifra B’raita d’Rabbi Yishmael
-kal vachomer (a fortiori): (Bamidbar 12:14): "And the L–rd said to Moses: Now if her
+* kal vachomer (a fortiori): (Bamidbar 12:14): "And the L–rd said to Moses: Now if her (Miriam's) father had spat in her face, would she not be in shame for seven days!" — Kal vachomer, if the Shechinah does so, it should be fourteen days! (see Tosfoth, Bava Kamma 25a). But it suffices that a kal vachomer deduction parallel what it is deduced from; therefore, (Bamidbar 12:14): "Let her be sequestered seven days outside the camp, and then let her be gathered in."
-(Miriam's) father had spat in her face, would she not be in shame for seven days!" —
-Kal vachomer, if the Shechinah does so, it should be fourteen days! (see Tosfoth, Bava
+==== First Principle Explained – Jewish Virtual Library
-Kamma 25a). But it
+Kal va-ḥomer (more accurately kol va-ḥomer): an argument from the minor premise (kal) to the major (ḥomer). The Midrash (Gen. R. 92:7) traces its use to the Bible (cf. Gen. 44:8; Ex. 6:12; Num. 12:14 – not explicit but see BK 25a; Deut. 31:27; I Sam. 23:3; Jer. 12:5; Ezek. 15:5; Prov. 11:31; Esth. 9:12). The following two examples may be given: (a) It is stated in Deuteronomy 21:23 that the corpse of a criminal executed by the court must not be left on the gallows overnight, which R. Meir takes to mean that God is distressed by the criminal's death. Hence, R. Meir argues: "If God is troubled at the shedding of the blood of the ungodly, how much more [kal va-ḥomer] at the blood of the righteous!" (Sanh. 6:5). (b) "If priests, who are not disqualified for service in the Temple by age, are disqualified by bodily blemishes (Lev. 21:16–21) then Levites, who are disqualified by age (Num. 8:24–25), should certainly be disqualified by bodily blemishes" (Ḥul. 24a). Example (a), where the "minor" and "major" are readily apparent, might be termed a simple kal va-ḥomer. Example (b) might be termed a complex kal va-ḥomer. Here an extraneous element (disqualification by age) has to be adduced to indicate which is the "minor" and which the "major." Symbolically the two types can be represented as SIMPLE: If A has X, then B certainly has X. COMPLEX: If A, which lacks Y, has X, then B, which has Y, certainly has X. Schwarz (see bibliography) erroneously identifies the Aristotelean syllogism with the kal va-ḥomer. First, the element of "how much more" is lacking in the
-suffices that a kal vachomer deduction parallel what it is deduced from; therefore,
+syllogism. Second, the syllogism inference concerns genus and species: All men are mortal.
-(Bamidbar 12:14): "Let her be sequestered seven days outside the camp, and then let her
+Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal. Since Socrates belongs in the class "man" he must share the characteristics of that class. However, in the kal va-ḥomer it is not suggested that the "major" belongs in the
-be gathered in."
+class of the "minor" but that what is true of the "minor" must be true of the "major" (Kunst, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 10 (1942), 976–91). Not all of the thirteen principles are based on logic as is the kal va-ḥomer. Some are purely literary tools, while the gezeirah shavah is only valid if received through the transmission of a rabbinic tradition.
-First Principle Explained – Jewish Virtual Library
-Kal va-ḥomer (more accurately kol va-ḥomer): an argument from the minor premise
+The principle of dayyo ("it is sufficient"), that the conclusion should advance only as far as the premise and not beyond it, is a qualification of the kal va-ḥomer (BK 2:5). It must not be argued that if A has x, then B has x + y. The kal va-ḥomer suffices only to prove that B has x, and it is to go beyond the evidence to conclude that it also has y. R. Tarfon rejects the dayyo principle in certain instances (BK 25a).
-(kal) to the major (ḥomer). The Midrash (Gen. R. 92:7) traces its use to the Bible (cf. Gen.
-:8; Ex. 6:12; Num. 12:14 – not explicit but see BK 25a; Deut. 31:27; I Sam. 23:3; Jer. 12:5;
+=== Second Principle – Siddur Lev Shalem
-Ezek. 15:5; Prov. 11:31; Esth. 9:12). The following two examples may be given: (a) It is
-stated in Deuteronomy 21:23 that the corpse of a criminal executed by the court must
-not be left on the gallows overnight, which R. Meir takes to mean that God is distressed
-by the criminal's death. Hence, R. Meir argues: "If God is troubled at the shedding of the
-blood of the ungodly, how much more [kal va-ḥomer] at the blood of the righteous!"
-(Sanh. 6:5). (b) "If priests, who are not disqualified for service in the Temple by age, are
-disqualified by bodily blemishes (Lev. 21:16–21) then Levites, who are disqualified by age
-(Num. 8:24–25), should certainly be disqualified by bodily blemishes" (Ḥul. 24a). Example
-(a), where the "minor" and "major" are readily apparent, might be termed a simple kal
-va-ḥomer. Example (b) might be termed a complex kal va-ḥomer. Here an extraneous
-element (disqualification by age) has to be adduced to indicate which is the "minor" and
-which the "major." Symbolically the two types can be represented as SIMPLE: If A has
-X, then B certainly has X. COMPLEX: If A, which lacks Y, has X, then B, which has Y,
-certainly has X. Schwarz (see bibliography) erroneously identifies the Aristotelean
-syllogism with the kal va-ḥomer. First, the element of "how much more" is lacking in the
-syllogism. Second, the syllogism inference concerns genus and species:
-All men are mortal.
-Socrates is a man.
-Therefore Socrates is mortal.
-Since Socrates belongs in the class "man" he must share the characteristics of that
-class. However, in the kal va-ḥomer it is not suggested that the "major" belongs in the
-class of the "minor" but that what is true of the "minor" must be true of the "major"
-(Kunst, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 10 (1942), 976–91). Not
-all of the thirteen principles are based on logic as is the kal va-ḥomer. Some are purely
-literary tools, while the gezeirah shavah is only valid if received through the
-transmission of a rabbinic tradition.
-The principle of dayyo ("it is sufficient"), that the conclusion should advance only as far
-as the premise and not beyond it, is a qualification of the kal va-ḥomer (BK 2:5). It must
-not be argued that if A has x, then B has x + y. The kal va-ḥomer suffices only to prove
-that B has x, and it is to go beyond the evidence to conclude that it also has y. R. Tarfon
-rejects the dayyo principle in certain instances (BK 25a).
-Second Principle – Siddur Lev Shalem
 A general rule may be inferred from a similar phrase in two different texts.
 Second Principle – Gezeirah Shavah – Sifra B’raita d’Rabbi Yishmael
-) gezeirah shavah (Identity): It is stated in respect to a shomer sachar (a hired
+* 2) gezeirah shavah (Identity): It is stated in respect to a shomer sachar (a hired watchman) (Shemot 22:9): "The oath of the L–rd shall be between both, that he (the watcher) did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor," and, in respect to a shomer chinam (one who watches gratis) (Shemot 22:7): "that he did not send his hand, etc." Just as in the instance of a shomer sachar, in which it is written "that he did not send his hand," the heirs (of the watcher) are exempt (from an oath that their father did not send his hand, etc., it being written: "The oath of the L–rd shall be between both" [the owner and the watcher — and not between the heirs]), so, in the instance of a shomer chinam, where it is written "that he did not send his hand," the heirs are exempt.
-watchman) (Shemot 22:9): "The oath of the L–rd shall be between both, that he (the
-watcher) did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor," and, in respect to a
+==== Second Principle Explained – Jewish Virtual Library
-shomer chinam (one who watches gratis) (Shemot 22:7): "that he did not send his hand,
-etc." Just as in the instance of a shomer sachar, in which it is written "that he did not
-send his hand," the heirs (of the watcher) are exempt (from an oath that their father did
-not send his hand, etc., it being written: "The oath of the L–rd shall be between both"
-[the owner and the watcher — and not between the heirs]), so, in the instance of a
-shomer chinam, where it is written "that he did not send his hand," the heirs are exempt.
-Second Principle Explained – Jewish Virtual Library
 (2) Gezeirah shavah: comparison of similar expressions. It is probable that
 etymologically the word gezeirah means "law" – as in Daniel 4:4, 14 – so that gezeirah